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INNOCENT UNTIL BORN: WHY PRISONS SHOULD STOP
SHACKLING PREGNANT WOMEN TO PROTECT THE
CHILD
MELANIE KALMANSON*
ABSTRACT

The practice of American prisons to shackle and otherwise restrain incarcerated, pregnant women is problematic for several reasons. Such practices include shackling, chaining,
and handcuffing pregnant inmates during their third trimester, transportation to and from
medical facilities, labor and delivery, and postpartum recovery. Current discourse on this
topic focuses primarily on how these practices invade the woman’s civil liberties, particularly
the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and international human rights. Recent case law vindicates policy rationales for such practices—safety of others,
safety of the woman herself, and securing flight risks.
These discussions overlook and this Note confronts the state’s interests in fetal rights
and then, after birth, the child’s rights as a constitutionally protected person. Shifting the
shackling discussion to protecting the child, this Note argues that shackling practices should
be banned in all American institutions because they unconstitutionally infringe upon the
child’s rights to due process and against cruel and unusual punishment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1977 and 2004, the number of incarcerated females in the
United States increased by 757%, 1 primarily as a result of “the socalled war on drugs and related changes in legislation, law enforcement practices, and judicial decision-making.” 2 This increase was not
a result of an upsurge in violence perpetrated by American women.
Increasing female prison 3 populations heightens a related, genderspecific concern: how the pregnant prison population is treated while
incarcerated. In 2009, it was reported that, “at any given time, more
than 10,000 pregnant women are” incarcerated. 4 In other terms, a
2013 report indicated that 6% of the incarcerated female population is
pregnant. 5 It is unclear whether this incarcerated, pregnant population is comprised of women who enter prison pregnant 6 or become

* J.D., Magna Cum Laude, Florida State University College of Law, 2016; B.S., Magna
Cum Laude, Florida State University, 2013. Thank you to Professor Avlana Eisenberg for sup-

porting this project as part of her extremely insightful Prison Reform Seminar. Also, as my last
Note of law school, thank you to all of my professors who contributed to my developing passion
for academia—specifically Mary Ziegler, P. Mark Spottswood, and Courtney Cahill.
1. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU BRIEFING PAPER: THE SHACKLING OF PREGNANT
WOMEN & GIRLS IN U.S. PRISONS, JAILS & YOUTH DETENTION CENTERS, at *1,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/anti-shackling_briefing_paper_stand_alone.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9TSE-GP2L] [hereinafter ACLU BRIEFING PAPER].
2. DOROTHY Q. THOMAS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, ALL
TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS 17 (1996).
3. A “[c]orrectional institution” is any facility that “has the power to detain or restrain,
or both, a person under the laws of [its respective] state,” whether private or public. 55 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(a)(4) (2016); accord FLA. STAT. 944.241(2)(a) (2012). For this discussion, ‘prison’ is used synonymously with this definition of a ‘correctional institution’ and
implies no significant difference to a ‘jail’ or ‘detention center,’ or any other term to refer to
a place in which those convicted of a crime are detained.
4. Diana Kasdan, Abortion Access for Incarcerated Women: Are Correctional Health
Practices in Conflict with Constitutional Standards?, 41 VIEWPOINT 59, 59 (2009),
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/4105909.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXQ3-9FN2].
5. INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC ET AL., THE SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED PREGNANT
WOMEN: A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION COMMITTED REGULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(2013) [hereinafter SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN], https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/
sites/ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Report%20-%20Shackling%20of%20Pregnant%
20Prisoners%20in%20the%20US.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TA7-AWFK].
6. See EDNA WALKER CHANDLER, WOMEN IN PRISON 44 (1973) (“[M]any women come to
prison pregnant. . . . During 1972 there were 227 babies born to women in the thirty prisons
reporting.”); FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, ABORTION & REPRODUCTIVE
H EALTH CARE FOR INCARCERATED W OMEN
(2014)
[hereinafter
F AMILY
PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH], http://docplayer.net/23552500-Policy-brief-abortionreproductive-health-care-for-incarcerated-women.html [https://perma.cc/EBC9-LKAF] (“Approximately six to 10 percent of women are already pregnant when they enter a prison or jail . . . .”).
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pregnant in prison. 7 Sexual abuse by prison guards has been an endemic issue in American prisons for decades, 8 so it is possible that an
inmate may become pregnant while incarcerated as a result of such
abuse. 9 On the other hand, recent legislative and executive focus on
prosecuting pregnant women who use illegal substances or abuse legal
substances would, of course, contribute to the increased pregnant
prison population. 10 Nevertheless, the number of pregnant women who
are incarcerated in the United States is significant.
The problem is not that this population exists, but instead how pregnant women in American correctional institutions are treated—an essentially barbaric practice. Women are being chained and shackled during their third trimester, labor and delivery,11 and postpartum recovery. 12 States justify these practices as safety precautions for society, the
authorities, and the woman herself. However, this Note dispels these
alleged safety concerns and presents a new perspective on why these
policies should be banned, as suggested by recent federal legislation.
Rather than focusing on the incarcerated mother’s rights, 13 this
Note shifts the focus to the fetus and, thereafter, child by applying (1)
abortion jurisprudence when discussing the fetus and (2) constitutional law and child custody principles to protect the child, once born.
Based on the reasoning presented herein, each state should enact legislation to ban the restraint—shackling, abdominal-chaining, and

7. See FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6 (“[W]omen can
become pregnant while incarcerated during private visits with their partners, home visits,
while in work release programs . . . .”). Cf. Bill Mears, Supreme Court Allows Abortions for
Inmates, CNN (Mar. 24, 2008, 9:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/03/24/scotus/
index.html?eref=rss_us [https://perma.cc/QUS3-6JLL] (“The inmate . . . found out she was
pregnant just after she had been sentenced . . . to four months in the county jail for driving
while intoxicated.” (emphasis added)).
8. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 2, at 38-45;
IF/WHEN/HOW, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE IN THE PRISON SYSTEM 7 (2016),
http://www.ifwhenhow.org/resources/reproductive-justice-in-the-prison-system/ [https://
perma.cc/LD5L-UY9M] [hereinafter IF/WHEN/HOW].
9. FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6 (“[W]omen can become pregnant while incarcerated . . . as a result of sexual assault by staff.”).
10. See Mary Ziegler, Opinion, Everyone Agrees Women Who Have Abortions Shouldn’t
Be Penalized. Or Do They?, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2016/04/01/everyone-agrees-women-who-have-abortions-shouldnt-be-penalized-or-do-they/?utm_term=.b95f760e5a56 [https://perma.cc/P3PC-TLV2] (“The mainstream antiabortion movement had also expanded fetal rights, backing the prosecutions of
pregnant women who abused drugs or otherwise put pregnancies at risk.”). See generally
Eileen D. Collins, To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: The Dilemma Posed by Pregnancy and
Substance Abuse, 9 PUB. INT. L. REP. 23, 23 (2004).
11. See infra notes 44, 196-98 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (“As a consequence of their own
actions, prisoners may be deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty.”).
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handcuffing 14—of incarcerated, pregnant women to protect the state’s
interests in fetal life and safety and the child upon birth. Part II canvasses the current prison environment in which incarcerated, pregnant women live, including their limited access to abortion and the
types of restraints that are applied to them during pregnancy. Part II
also samples existing state legislation beginning this movement towards reduced restraints but explains that it is unlikely these protections are being enforced. Part III juxtaposes abortion jurisprudence—
namely, doctrine from the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 15 and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey16 and
their progeny—to establish that the state has an interest in protecting
the fetus being carried by an incarcerated, pregnant woman. Part III
then argues that once the child is born, or the time-period shifts from
the third trimester to labor and delivery, an independent, constitutionally protected individual exists, which requires banning restraints
during labor and delivery. Part III also applies the statutory best interests framework, which is at the center of child custody disputes, to
emphasize how restraining a pregnant inmate undermines the state’s
interest in protecting the child. Part IV recommends the enactment of
nation-wide legislation mirroring policies purportedly applied by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons.
II. PREGNANT WOMEN IN THE CURRENT U.S. PRISON SYSTEM
That incarcerated women are shackled, chained, and handcuffed in
prison during some of the most physically taxing times of their pregnancy is a reality of which many unimprisoned Americans are unaware. 17 Yet, related topics like women’s access to reproductive care—
contraception, 18 abortion,19 etc.—are mainstream issues. Disconnect
IF/WHEN/HOW, supra note 8, at 6.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See, e.g., Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the
Age of Prisons, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 497, 501-02 (1994) (referring to a disconnect between society and what happens inside prisons).
18. E.g., Ziegler, supra note 10; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Burwell,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/roman-catholic-archbishop-ofSCOTUSBLOG,
washington-v-burwell/ [https://perma.cc/R275-4JTH] (discussing a case pending currently
before the U.S. Supreme Court addressing whether companies’ First Amendment rights are
being violated by being forced to comply with the federal government mandate to provide
contraception to employees, despite the religious beliefs of the owners against the
practice); Smear Campaign Against Planned Parenthood, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/smear-campaign-against-plannedparenthood [https://perma.cc/5LKX-VCH7] (detailing recent pushback against Planned
Parenthood’s efforts to provide reproductive care to women, including legislative movements).
19. E.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (most recent case
from the U.S. Supreme Court on abortion); see Mary Ziegler, Symposium: The Court Once
Again Makes the “Undue-Burden” Test a Referendum on the Facts, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27,
14.
15.
16.
17.
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between prison and civic societies explains why, until recently, the
maltreatment of pregnant, incarcerated women was generally undetected and not addressed in legislation. 20
This Part first explains the current environment in which pregnant
women who are incarcerated live and the governmental rationale for
the surrounding policies. It then samples related state legislation from
across the country and summarizes recent efforts challenging shackling practices on the basis of constitutional and international human
rights. This informative Part sets the stage of the current discourse for
the shift in discussion that Part III introduces.

A. How Incarceration Limits a Woman’s Access to Care
Women compose an increasing proportion of the American prison
population;21 and, approximately 6% of the female prison population is
pregnant. 22 Pregnancy in prison is much different than being pregnant
in ‘free’ society. When an incarcerated woman is pregnant, her options
as to how her pregnancy will proceed are severely limited by her incarceration and the prison facility’s resulting control over her medical
care. 23 In contrast, a ‘free’ woman may completely control her pregnancy, including whether the pregnancy will be carried to term, which
doctor treats her, how and where she will give birth, how and where
she will recover from labor and delivery, etc.
“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his [or her] medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” 24
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it is “the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” 25 When medical care is denied, the result is, at least, “pain
and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.” 26 At its worse, such denial of medical care could amount to a vio-

2016, 2:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-the-court-once-againmakes-the-undue-burden-test-a-referendum-on-the-facts/ [https://perma.cc/8MLM-UBUY].
20. Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
237, 240 (2009); see, e.g., SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5; Sowle, supra
note 17, at 501-02.
21. See Stav Ziv, Report: America’s Prison Population Is Growing Again, NEWSWEEK
(Dec. 22, 2014, 2:55 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/americas-correctional-system-numbers293583 [https://perma.cc/YR8W-7BSC].
22. See SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5.
23. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510-11 (2011).
24. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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lation of the inmate’s Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. 27 Nonetheless, “[e]ach day, men, women, and children
behind bars suffer needlessly from lack of access to adequate medical
and mental health care. Chronic illnesses go untreated, emergencies are
ignored, and patients with serious mental illness fail to receive necessary care.” 28 Pregnant women are among those inmates not receiving
adequate medical care from American correctional institutions.29
More significantly, a woman’s pregnancy is altered by incarceration. For example, in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court established that
women have a right to choose to have an abortion, protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 This holding of
Roe v. Wade in 1973 was affirmed in 1992 by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 31 In
2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment—
thereby tacitly assenting to or “let[ting] stand”—“a lower court’s ruling
that female inmates have a constitutional right to abortions off jail
grounds.” 32 Thus, the fundamental right to choose to have an abortion,
is not a right lost upon incarceration. 33
Despite these constitutional protections, correctional institutions
often limit, or sometimes altogether eliminate, a female inmate’s right

27. Id. at 103-04; Sara Baez, Student Argues Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated
at Conference in Dominican Republic, MIAMI LAW (June 28, 2016),
http://www.law.miami.edu/news/2016/june/student-argues-reproductive-rights-incarceratedwomen-conference-dominican-republic [https://perma.cc/8U5S-URAW]; see U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
and Mental Health Care, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION,
28. Medical
https://www.aclu.org/issues/prisoners-rights/medical-and-mental-health-care [https://
perma.cc/GB24-WDP7]; accord Medical Care for Prisoners, CTR. FOR PRISONER HEALTH &
HUM. RIGHTS, http://www.prisonerhealth.org/resources-for-prisoners-families-and-advocates/prisoners-and-families/ [https://perma.cc/PW8Z-L69U].
29. See Vania Leveille, Bureau of Prisons Revises Policy on Shackling of Pregnant Inmates, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 20, 2008), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/
bureau-prisons-revises-policy-shackling-pregnant-inmates [https://perma.cc/7AG6-3A9G].
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
31. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
32. Mears, supra note 7. That denying reproductive rights due to incarceration amounts
to a violation of the Eighth Amendment is likely a compelling argument not presented here.
See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510-11 (2011); Arpaio v. Doe, 552 U.S. 1280 (2008).
33. E.g., FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6; Complaint at
2, Doe v. Singleton, No. 3:15-cv-01215-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 20, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint]
(“[A] woman has a fundamental right to decide whether or not to bear a child. This right
survives incarceration.”); see Arpaio, 552 U.S. at 1280; see also Brown, 563 U.S. at 510
(“[T]he law and the Constitution demand recognition of certain other rights.”). But cf. James
Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 21, 28-29 (2012) (listing the rights one does lose upon conviction—during incarceration and after release—such as the right to vote, the right to serve on a jury, and eligibility
for welfare assistance).
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to choose to terminate her pregnancy.34 In fact, “a significant proportion of [correctional] facilities refuse to allow abortion access” to inmates. 35 Even facilities that, in theory, allow inmates to choose an
abortion fail to assist women in actually accessing abortions, further
undermining the reality that incarcerated women can exercise their
fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy. 36 As a result,
incarcerated women are essentially forced to carry their pregnancies
to term. 37 One scholar, in particular, drawing from international human rights standards “argues that the denial of an abortion to an incarcerated woman should constitute torture and a violation of the
Eighth Amendment.” 38 Justice Ginsburg’s 2016 concurrence in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 39 may also suggest an Eighth Amendment violation from such denial due to the danger and possible complications of childbirth that the state is thereby forcing upon incarcerated women.40 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hellerstedt suggested that abortion implicates “important human values.” 41 That
said, if a woman is pregnant, incarcerated, and obliged to carry her
pregnancy to term, how is the state treating her during pregnancy and
the fetus during gestation?

34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
35. Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59; accord, e.g., Complaint, supra note 33, at 2 (requesting
relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as the Sheriff denied Plaintiff, a pregnant inmate, access to an abortion).
36. Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59; accord FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE
RESEARCH, supra note 6. Officers’ ability to act depending on the specific case and their related personal feelings towards an inmate furthers the frustration of reproductive access
for female inmates. Kimberly Goldberg, Pregnant Women and Mothers Behind Bars, 8
L. & SOC’Y J. UCSB 125, 128 (2009).
37. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 36, at 128 (explaining the story of how a combination of
bureaucracy and state laws in Louisiana forced Victoria W. to carry her pregnancy to term);
id. at 133 (“Women in prison need to be able to have the choice of an abortion readily available
to them.”); Samantha Lachman, Alabama Moves to Deny Inmate Parental Rights So She
Can’t Have Abortion, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/alabama-inmate-parental-rights-abortion_us_55b9056ee4b0224d8834ca9b
[https://
perma.cc/A9NB-X3FC]. This is not elaborated on here; though, the denial of abortion to an
inmate could likely amount to an infringement on an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights
under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
38. Baez, supra note 27.
39. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
40. See also id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“When a State severely limits access
to safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed
rogue practitioners, faute de mieux, at great risk to their health and safety.”).
41. Id. at 2305 (majority opinion) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24,
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
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B. Chained and Shackled by American Correctional Institutions
In addition to a general lack of medical care and severely restricted access to abortion, 42 pregnant inmates in U.S. correctional
facilities are often physically restrained during the third trimester, 43
transportation to and from medical facilities, labor and delivery, 44
and postpartum recovery. 45 Yet, “[a]t least two courts have held that
pregnancy, at least in its later stages, constitutes a serious medical
need,” 46 indicating that medical care may not be denied to inmates
under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 47In Illinois, the pioneer in
anti-shackling legislation—as explained in Section 1 below—defines
“restraints” as:
[A]ny physical restraint or mechanical device used to control the
movement of a prisoner’s body or limbs, or both, including, but not
limited to, flex cuffs, soft restraints, hard metal handcuffs, a black
box, Chubb cuffs, leg irons, belly chains, a security (tether) chain, or
a convex shield, or shackles of any kind. 48

42. FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6 (reporting low rates
of pregnancy care—prenatal exercise, nutrition counseling, medication, testing, etc.—for inmates). But cf. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 132 (“Many argue that because the majority of
women in prison are poor, they are actually receiving better services for their pregnancy
than they would outside of prison.”).
43. SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5; Andrea Hsu, Difficult Births:
Laboring and Delivering in Shackles, NPR (July 16, 2010, 3:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=128563037 [https://perma.cc/EW48-M5QW].
44. AM. MED. ASS’N., AN “ACT TO PROHIBIT THE SHACKLING OF PREGNANT
PRISONERS” MODEL STATE LEGISLATION (2015), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/
default/files/media-browser/specialty%20group/arc/shackling-pregnant-prisoners-issue-brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HVN-7X6F]; ACLU BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 1. “Labor” is defined as:
[T]he period of time before a birth and shall include any medical condition in which a woman
is sent or brought to the hospital for the purpose of delivering her baby. These situations
include: induction of labor, prodromal labor, pre-term labor, prelabor rupture of membranes,
the 3 stages of active labor, uterine hemorrhage during the third trimester of pregnancy, and
caesarian delivery including pre-operative preparation.
55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(a)(2) (2016); accord FLA. STAT. § 944.241(2)(e) (2015).
45. AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 44. “Post-partum” is defined by Illinois, for example,
as “the period immediately following delivery, including the entire period a woman is in the
hospital or infirmary after birth.” 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(a)(3) (2016). Florida’s definition is a bit more restrictive, defining “postpartum recovery” as: [T]he period immediately
following delivery, including the recovery period when a woman is in the hospital or infirmary following birth, up to 24 hours after delivery unless the physician after consultation
with the department or correctional institution recommends a longer period of time.
FLA. STAT. § 944.241(2)(f) (2015) (emphasis added).
46. ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS:
MEDICAL, DENTAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 3, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/field_document/know_your_rights_--_medical_mental_health_and_dental_july_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MVV7-WA8F].
47. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
48. 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(a)(1) (2016).
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Generally, when such policies exist without restrictive legislation,
these restraints are used “regardless of [the woman’s] history of violence or escape,” 49 meaning the practices are uniformly applied without consideration of case-by-case necessity or appropriateness. This
Section further explains existing shackling practices, 50 the policy rationales supporting these practices, and current legislation aiming to
reduce such practices—the effectiveness of which may be doubtful.
Security is the central tenant of pro-shackling contentions. Likely
the most broadly accepted rationale for shackling practices is that they
protect third parties—the public, health professionals, and guards—
from the woman when she is outside of the correctional facility for
medical treatment. 51 For example, when a woman is transported to the
hospital to give birth, advocates would say shackling is necessary to
ensure the safety of those with whom she may come in contact. 52 Likewise, shackling and chaining pregnant women allegedly ensures that
the woman will not escape, which would pose harm to society and the
woman herself. 53 To that end, shackling also allegedly protects the
pregnant woman from harming herself. In essence, prison “administrators will not lose sight of the fact that some of the imprisoned
women are dangerous criminals . . .,” which, to them, generally justifies these practices. 54

49. FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6.
50. An entirely separate discussion could be had on the history and locality of shackling
practices. Briefly, are traditionally conservative institutes more apt to have these policies in
place because they have historically minimized women’s rights; or, are they less likely to
have these policies due to their strong opposition to abortion and support of fetal protection?
See Amy E. Lerman & Joshua Page, The State of the Job: An Embedded Work Role Perspective on Prison Officer Attitudes, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 503, 509, 519 (2012). I would hypothesize something towards the former because the discussion on shackling, for the most
part, has focused on the mother and her rights. That is what sets this Note apart: its differential focus on the fetus rather than the mother. To that end, the states that received an F
on their shackling “report card” in 2008 were Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, and North Carolina. The Rebecca Project for Human Rights, Shackling
Policies, in NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., MOTHERS BEHIND BARS, 19 (Oct. 2010),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/mothersbehindbars2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BXD5-D59M] [hereinafter Shackling Policies]. Or, is the prison industry a completely separable group from its respective geographical states with its own ideals that support these
practices? See Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69
VAND. L. REV. 71, 118, 135 n.387 (2016).
51. See SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 6.
52. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 36, at 125 (“In September 2005, . . . a pregnant inmate
in Wisconsin, was rushed to the hospital in handcuffs and leg shackles to have her labor
induced . . . . [Her] restraints were left on even after the doctor ruptured her amniotic sac
and asked her to pace the hallway for several hours to start the labor going.”); id. at 132.
53. E.g., Claire Louise Griggs, Birthing Barbarism: The Unconstitutionality of Shackling Pregnant Prisoners, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 250-51 (2011).
54. CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 34 (emphasis added).
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1. Current Policies on Shackling and Chaining
Until recently, neither federal nor state legislation was concerned
with the physical well-being of imprisoned women. 55 Since then, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) has promulgated restrictive policies
on shackling practices; some states have enacted restrictive legislation; and organizations have set suggestive standards limiting the use
of these restraints. This Sub-Section describes those efforts and expounds upon their effect.

(a) Federal Policy
In 2008, the FBP banned the “shackling of pregnant prisoners absent
extenuating circumstances.” 56 This federal policy change requires all
states to “follow the same federal policies regarding incarcerated pregnant women.” 57 The FBP’s report stated “that no restraints may be used
on a pregnant prisoner unless there is a risk of escape or a threat that
the prisoner will cause harm to herself or staff.”58 The FBP also allowed
an exception for “extremely violent prisoner[s],” who may be restrained
so long as the measures used are the least restrictive. 59 The FBP also
banned any use of control belts—“a device that administers an electrical
shock when triggered”—on pregnant women.60 This federal legislation
sends a strong message on the seriousness of shackling; however, the
practical effectiveness of this federal legislation is minimal.61
Due to fundamental federalism concerns and the Tenth Amendment, direct control of prison operations and policies is indefinitely localized.62 As an issue of health and safety, prison management and
health concerns therein are a matter of state police power in which the
federal government may not dip its toe. 63 Likewise, the FBP legislation
55. See Goldberg, supra note 36, at 126. Generally, there is a lack of focus in legislation
on the rights of the accused and incarcerated. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Criminal

Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give
a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993) (arguing that

this absence of legislation is a result of public choice theory).
56. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 125; accord FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE
RESEARCH, supra note 6.
57. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 130.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. This seems to reflect the strict scrutiny standard. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
60. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 130 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ESCORTED TRIPS 13-14
(2008), www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/bop_policy_escorted_trips_p5538_05.pdf).
61. See Leveille, supra note 29.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. X; e.g., Goldberg, supra note 36, at 126; id. at 125 (“Although
the passing of the new federal law is a step towards women gaining the rights they deserve,
it remains vague and does little for the overall well being of pregnant women in prison.”).
63. Due Process of Law: Health, Safety, and Morals, JUSTIA, (citing Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887)) http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/14-healthmine-morals.html [https://perma.cc/9RQJ-XGB3]; see Melanie Kalmanson, Filling the Gap

2017]

INNOCENT UNTIL BORN

861

practically “only applies [as binding authority] to prisons and detention centers operated by the federal government, and does not reach
state and local facilities.” 64 As a result, shackling policies and legislation differ from state-to-state. 65

(b) State Legislation
Likely underlying the varying policies is each state’s theory of imprisonment, namely whether the focus should be punitive or rehabilitative. 66 Shackling furthers penal goals but undermines rehabilitative
goals. But, lack of transparency complicates any real analysis of local
policies because the prison system and implementation of policies is
localized to the point that determining exactly what happens ‘on the
inside’ is almost impossible. 67 Thus, state statutes are not completely
indicative of what actually occurs inside correctional facilities—a significant portion of which are privately operated.68 Nevertheless, this
Section surveys existing state legislation.
In 2000, Illinois was the first state to act on the issue of shackling
policies by enacting legislation, stating:
Notwithstanding any other statute, directive, or administrative regulation, when a pregnant female prisoner is brought to a hospital
from a County Department of Corrections facility for the purpose of
delivering her baby, no handcuffs, shackles, or restraints of any
kind may be used during her transport to a medical facility for the
purpose of delivering her baby. Under no circumstances may leg
irons or shackles or waist shackles be used on any pregnant female
prisoner who is in labor. Upon the pregnant female prisoner’s entry
to the hospital delivery room, a county correctional officer must be
posted immediately outside the delivery room. The Sheriff must provide for adequate personnel to monitor the pregnant female prisoner

of Domestic Violence Protection: Returning Human Rights to U.S. Victims, 43 FLA. ST. U.L.

REV. 1359, 1381 n.186 (2016) (explaining the framework surrounding the Tenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution in more depth).
64. SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 10; accord Leveille, supra
note 29.
65. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 36, at 128; FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE
RESEARCH, supra note 6. For a comprehensive look at state-by-state legislation, relative to
other states, see Shackling Policies, supra note 50.
66. See generally, e.g., Sowle, supra note 18 (explaining these different rationales
for punishment).
67. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 128; Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59; Tracey L. Meares,

Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 852-53 n.4 (1995); SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED
WOMEN, supra note 5, at 13.
68. See Goldberg, supra note 36, at 128 (“Almost all states have general policies regard-

ing pregnant inmates, but those policies are not explicitly articulated in the law and can
therefore be violated by corrections departments without many consequences.”).
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during her transport to and from the hospital and during her stay
at the hospital. 69

In 2012, Florida enacted its Healthy Pregnancies for Incarcerated
Women Act.70 This Act proscribes the use of restraints “on a prisoner
who is known to be pregnant during labor, delivery, and postpartum
recovery, unless the corrections official makes an individualized determination that the prisoner presents an extraordinary circumstance.” 71
Even in the excusable “extraordinary circumstance,” however, “leg, ankle, or waist restraints [cannot] be used on any pregnant prisoner who
is in labor or delivery.” 72 When the exception of “extraordinary circumstance[s]” is invoked, Florida requires that restraints be
“applied . . . in the least restrictive manner necessary,” and the officer
invoking the exception “shall make written findings . . . as to the extraordinary circumstance that dictated the use of the restraints.”73
Florida also requires that shackling policies be posted in correctional
facilities so that inmates are aware of the practices. 74
Minnesota is a state with a more rehabilitative focus, 75 and its
shackling policies seem to reflect such disposition. Minnesota’s statute
is similar to Florida’s and provides an exception to its ban of restraints
for specific circumstances and requires “the least restrictive [means]
available and the most reasonable [restraints] under the circumstances” when the exception is invoked. 76 It also seems to clarify, or
expand upon, Florida’s vague “extraordinary circumstance” language,
providing that “a woman known to be pregnant” cannot be restrained
“unless the representative makes an individualized determination
that restraints are reasonably necessary for the legitimate safety and

security needs of the woman, correctional staff, other inmates, or the
public.” 77 Note the consistency here with the policy rationales for these

practices in general, i.e., protecting third parties who may come in contact with the woman. Further, if the woman is in labor or has given

69. 1999 Ill. Laws 91-253 (effective Jan. 1, 2000); accord SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED
WOMEN, supra note 5, at 10.
70. FLA. STAT. § 944.241(3)(a) (2015).
71. Id. (emphasis added). Note the knowledge requirement here, almost imposing a
mens rea standard on the state, which creates an apparent excuse if the state somehow may
claim it did not know the woman was pregnant.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 944.241(3)(b).
74. Id. § 944.241(5)(b).
75. See generally Lerman & Page, supra note 50 (comparing the theories of punishment
of California and Minnesota by analyzing their policies and the attitudes of officers).
76. MINN. STAT. § 241.88(1)(a) (2015).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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birth within the preceding three days—referred to as postpartum—78
Minnesota law provides that restraints may only be used if:
(1) there is a substantial flight risk or some other extraordinary
medical or security circumstance that dictates restraints be used to
ensure the safety and security of the woman, the staff of the correctional or medical facility, other inmates, or the public;
(2) the [correctional facility] representative has made an individualized determination that restrains are necessary to prevent escape
or injury;
(3) there is no objection from the treating medical care provider; and
(4) the restrains used are the least restrictive type and are used in
the least restrictive manner. 79

Minnesota also addresses another aspect of shackling concerns that
is seemingly absent from Florida’s statute: the transportation of pregnant inmates. Minnesota limits restraints during transportation, specifically prohibiting restraints that “cross or otherwise touch the
woman’s abdomen” and any type of wrist restraint that is “affixed behind the woman’s back.” 80 Also, Minnesota goes further than Florida’s
notice requirement and requires that facility staff be trained on these
statutory provisions.81
As of August 2013, eighteen states had laws limiting the restraint
of pregnant inmates; twenty-four states had less formal policies limiting the restraint of pregnant inmates; and, eight states did not have
any form of regulation on the restraint of pregnant inmates.82

(c) Organizational Standards
Shackling is also an organizational concern, and organizations like
the American Bar Association (ABA) signal to the states by promulgating standards to suggest appropriate legislation or restrictions. The
ABA weighed in on the shackling discussion, setting the following
related standards:
(a) A pregnant prisoner should receive necessary prenatal and postpartum care and treatment, including an adequate diet, clothing,
appropriate accommodations . . . , and childbirth and infant care
education. Any restraints used on a pregnant prisoner or one who
78. See supra note 45.
79. MINN. STAT. § 241.88(1)(c).
80. Id. § 241.88(1)(b).
81. Id. § 241.88(2).
82. SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 10. This is a significant improvement from 2008, when forty-seven states had no legislation to restrict the practice of
shackling pregnant women. Leveille, supra note 29.
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has recently delivered a baby should be medically appropriate; correctional authorities should consult with health care staff to ensure
that restraints do not compromise the pregnancy or the prisoner’s
health.
(b) . . . . A prisoner should not be restrained while she is in labor,

including during transport, except in extraordinary circumstances
after an individualized finding that security requires restraint, in
which event correctional and health care staff should cooperate to
use the least restrictive restraints necessary for security, which
should not interfere with the prisoner’s labor.

(c) Governmental authorities should facilitate access to abortion services for a prisoner who decides to exercise her right to an abortion,
as that right is defined by state and federal law . . . .
....
(e) . . . . Governmental authorities should ordinarily allow a prisoner
who gives birth while in a correctional facility or who already has
an infant at the time she is admitted to a correctional facility to keep
the infant with her for a reasonable time, preferably on extended
furlough or in an appropriate community facility or, if that is not
practicable or reasonable, in a nursery at a correctional facility that
is staffed by qualified persons. Governmental authorities should
provide appropriate health care to children in such facilities.

(f) If long-term imprisonment is anticipated, a prisoner with an infant should be helped to develop necessary plans for alternative care
for the infant following the period described in subdivision (e) of this
Standard, in coordination with social service agencies. A prisoner

should be informed of the consequences for the prisoner’s parental
rights of any arrangements contemplated. When a prisoner and infant are separated, the prisoner should be provided with counseling
and other mental health support. 83

These standards from the ABA seem to be the most protective, as compared to the FBP’s policies and state legislation. First, the ABA starts
with providing the inmate the option to terminate the pregnancy by
directing access to abortion. 84 Proceeding through gestation, the ABA’s
standards restricting shackling or other physical restraints cover all
three time periods—third trimester (albeit the entire pregnancy), labor and delivery, and postpartum—and also explicitly provide for
transportation during these times. The ABA standards also include a

83. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-6.9, at
173-74 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/Treatment_
of_Prisoners.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QDS-FHBS] (emphasis added).
84. Id. § 23-6.9(c).
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notice provision, 85 like that in Florida’s statute. 86 Most significantly,
the ABA standards provide the most deference to medical professionals and direct the most restrictive usage of such restraints when the
narrow exception for “extraordinary circumstances” is invoked. 87 Further, they recognize the importance of the postpartum period and direct that the mother and infant not be separated “for a reasonable
time.” 88 These ABA-promulgated standards appear to be the most comprehensive step toward protecting incarcerated, pregnant females
from the detrimental effects of shackling practices. 89

2. Efforts to Reduce or Ban Shackling and Relevant Case Law
Likewise, the treatment of pregnant, incarcerated women in American correctional institutions has been recently contemplated by interest group efforts, scholarship, and court actions. Current movements
look to the following authorities to advocate for the repeal of shackling
practices: international human rights standards, such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the U.S. Constitution, specifically
the Eighth Amendment. 90
The international human rights approach draws upon fundamental
understandings of basic human rights, particularly the principles that
(1) all humans, regardless of incarceration, must be treated with dignity and respect and (2) torture or cruel punishment are prohibited. 91
These are the same arguments advanced against using torture in the
War on Terror. Organizations like the International Human Rights
Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School and the ACLU National
Prison Project argue that shackling practices violate these inalienable
human rights. 92 The international human rights community recognized this concern in 2006 when the Human Rights Committee (“Committee”) raised questions about reconciling shackling practices within
the context of the guarantees of the ICCPR.93
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. § 23-6.9(f).

FLA. STAT. § 994.241(5) (2016).
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 83, § 23-6.9(b).
Id. § 23-6.9(e).
See discussion infra Section III.A.
ACLU BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 1; Int’l Human Rights Clinic, Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners in the United States, https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/page/shackling-pregnantprisoners-united-states [https://perma.cc/GFN6-A23G].
91. See SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing that shackling practices violate the ICCPR).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2. There was a follow-up to this initial concern in 2013. Id. at 3.
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Regardless of the legitimacy of this international human rights argument, achieving change via international authority is inherently difficult.94 The United States has a history of denying responsibility under international norms in varying contexts or denying the authority
of international documents. 95 Likewise, the United States’ response to
the Committee’s concerns has been to point to existing legislation—
federal and state—that conforms to the ICCPR. 96 Existing legislation
is incomplete, though. Some states completely lack legislation addressing these concerns. The goal should be to create uniform standards or
legislation to ensure that all states are in conformance with the demands of international human rights. 97
The Eighth Amendment approach argues that shackling practices
amount to “cruel and unusual punishment[].” 98 These claims are reviewed under the “deliberate indifference” standard, which is comprised of conjunctive objective and subjective elements,99 whereby an
official must demonstrate “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury.” 100 First, the objective element requires that “a
detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that such a risk
is one that society chooses not to tolerate.”101 In other words, if society
feels sufficiently threatened by an unrestrained inmate, shackling is
objectively justified. Next, the subjective element requires proving
that the officer had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 102
In 2009, in Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 103 the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vindicated this argument
and held that shackling practices violate the Eighth Amendment. 104
There, the Plaintiff, who was pregnant while incarcerated for the nonviolent crime of credit fraud, was shackled to her wheel chair while
94. See generally, e.g., Kalmanson, supra note 63, at Section IV.A (discussing the struggle of vindicating international authority within the context of protecting victims of domestic
violence in the United States, despite international norms requiring such protection).
95. See Kalmanson, supra note 63, at Section IV.A (discussing the demeanor of the
United States in the domestic violence context under the authority of the American Declaration of Human Rights).
96. SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 3.
97. Cf. discussion supra Section II.B.1.b (explaining the state-specific nature of
this legislation).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 9.
99. Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008)) (requiring that both the objective and subjective element be established before a violation is proven).
100. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation
for medical malpractice).
101. Villegas, 709 F.3d at 569; accord id. at 568 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
36 (1993)).
102. Id. at 569 (citing Harrison, 539 F.3d at 518); accord id. at 575-76.
103. 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009).
104. Id. at 534.
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experiencing medical pains and then shackled to the bed during labor. 105 The Eighth Circuit found that the security officer imposing
these restrictions acted with deliberate indifference (discussed below)
in using these restraints, with the shackling amounting to a violation
of the Eighth Amendment. 106
In 2013, in Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 107 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit again applied the “deliberate indifference” standard, analyzing whether instances of shackling
are unconstitutional.108 Though ultimately reversing summary judgment for the Plaintiff (inmate) due to factual disputes, 109 the Sixth Circuit established that “the shackling of pregnant detainees while in labor offends contemporary standards of human decency such that the
practice violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’—i.e., it poses a substantial
risk of serious harm.” 110 The court made clear that “shackling women
during labor runs afoul of the protections of the Eighth Amendment”
of the U.S. Constitution. 111 However, the Court observed that “the
right to be free from shackling during labor is not unqualified.”112
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed previously established exceptions to
allow such ‘unconstitutional’ restraint when the pregnant inmate “presents a danger to herself or others,” or “poses a flight risk.” 113 Essentially, the Sixth Circuit, like the Eighth, vindicated the policy rationales for shackling in the first place. The subjective element allowed the
Court to excuse an officer for not removing restraints, despite a “no
restraint order” from the hospital, because there was no proof that the
officer himself was aware of the order. 114
These practices and the remaining loopholes in the regulations
show that even at her most tender and intimate life-stage—child
birth—a woman is viewed and treated like a monster, or sub-human,
in American institutions.115 Thus, these rulings that shackling violates
the Eighth Amendment are practically weak and serve only to embellish
105. Griggs, supra note 53, at 252.
106. Id. (citing Nelson, 583 F.3d at 522, 529).
107. 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013).
108. Id. at 571 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)).
109. Id. at 578.
110. Id. at 574 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
111. Id.
112. Id. Note the parallel here to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), where the Court
concluded that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but [such] right
is not unqualified . . . .”
113. Villegas, 709 F.3d at 574.
114. Id. at 576.
115. See Lerman & Page, supra note 50, at 524.
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the courts’ sympathy without actually effectuating protection for pregnant inmates. The issue remains that broad exceptions exist which officials may invoke with little to no oversight to allow shackling.
III. RECOGNIZING THE OTHER ENTITY: BANNING SHACKLING
PRACTICES TO PROTECT THE FETUS AND THEN CHILD
Anti-shackling arguments, explained above, generally focus on the
mother’s rights; if any discussion centers on the fetus or child, it is a
general notion of the medical effects borne by the fetus or child as a
result of the restraints. The rationale may be that a fetus does not have
rights under the Constitution, and so it seems more obvious and advantageous to focus on the mother.116 Biologically inherent in this conversation, though often overlooked, is another human being: the child
who enters the world at a time when shackling is still employed. 117
What previous and developing arguments fail to adequately consider is that shackling is increasingly problematic when the fetus becomes a child. To that end, in all time periods discussed here, the fetus
is one that will be carried to term, thereby distinguishing this issue
from abortion, through which the fetus will not be carried to term and
does not reach the second point of the shackling discussion—labor and
delivery. We know that this discussion is different based on prisons’
efforts to undermine female inmates’ access to abortion. 118
This Part first explains the detrimental effects shackling has on the
mother, the fetus, and the child. Section B then sets up the argument
that banning shackling would protect the fetus—for which the state
has accepted responsibility upon viability in the abortion context—and
the child by discussing the state’s interests involved in shackling. Section C bolsters the state’s interests against shackling by dispelling the
purported safety policy justifications behind shackling. Assembling
this discussion, Section D contends that shackling practices are unconstitutional when viewed in light of the state’s interests in protecting
potential fetal life—the full gestation of which is almost guaranteed in
this context—and the child’s individual, untampered constitutional
rights as a “person” under the U.S. Constitution, independent from its
incarcerated mother.

116. But cf. Lachman, supra note 37 (explaining efforts in Alabama to recognize
fetal interests).
117. Note this is distinguishable and non-transferable to abortion discourse wherein the
fetus is never intended to be born and remains a fetus rather than a child.
118. See supra discussion Section II.A.
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A. Detrimental Effects of Shackling
“[T]he justifications for shackling pale in comparison to the severe
damage and degradation it causes.” 119 The effects of shackling on the
mother are an obvious concern, especially considering that incarcerated women are generally “treated less well than men while their gender-specific needs have been ignored.” 120 Few things are more gender
specific than pregnancy and childbirth, 121 not to mention the emotional
intensity of the childbearing process, which is increased not only by
incarceration but also the use of these barbaric devices. 122 Shackling
the mother during labor and delivery inherently complicates these intimate and life-changing processes and poses risk to the infant. 123
Directly affecting the mother and the fetus, restraints interfere
with the mother’s balance. 124 When restrained, it is more likely that
the mother will lose her balance and fall, risking injury to the fetus
“because of [the mother’s] inability to catch herself” when handcuffed.125 Florida’s statute directly addresses this concern, providing
that “[i]f wrist restraints are used [in the third trimester], they must
be applied in the front so the pregnant prisoner is able to protect herself in the event of a forward fall.” 126
Inherent in the word “restraint” is the fact that using shackles,
handcuffs, and chains on a pregnant woman during labor and delivery
complicates these processes. Specifically, the woman’s movement is restricted, lessening her ability to change positions as necessary. 127 For
example, in Nelson (the Eighth Circuit case discussed above), the
mother/inmate “suffered a hip dislocation and an umbilical hernia directly resulting from the shackles that prevented” her from moving her
legs.128 Medical personnel are also restricted in their access to the
mother and fetus during delivery, which may jeopardize the safety of
119. Griggs, supra note 53, at 251.
120. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 2, at 22.
121. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (“The mother who carries a child to full term is subject
to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.”); Goldberg, supra note
36, at 131 (“[T]rauma [is] caused by shackling a pregnant prisoner.”).
123. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 131 (quoting Assemblywoman Sally J. Leiber) (citing
AMNESTY INT’L USA, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN).
124. E.g., Griggs, supra note 53, at 253.
125. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 131; accord Griggs, supra note 53, at 253.
126. FLA. STAT. § 944.241(3)(c)(2) (2015) (emphasis added). Minnesota’s statute also considers this, just not as explicitly. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
127. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 131.
128. Griggs, supra note 53, at 253. For more information on an umbilical hernia, see
Umbilical Hernia, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/umbilical-hernia/basics/definition/con-20025630 [https://perma.cc/N2NK-5VBW].
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the child.129 Especially in an emergency situation, restricting medical
personnel could cause physical harm to the child.130 In fact, even a minor delay could cause “permanent brain damage to the child.” 131
In conclusion, the risks posed by using restraints on pregnant inmates outweigh any possible benefit these practices could serve. Specifically, these practices pose medical, physical, and emotional risks to
the mother and fetus/infant/child. Thus, pregnancy is itself an extraordinary circumstance that repudiates the use of shackles, handcuffs, or
other restraints on pregnant inmates.

B. The State’s Interests
When considering almost any legislation, two sides are almost always involved. Here, the two interests to review are (1) the state’s interests in enacting the legislation and (2) the interests of those affected
by the legislation. This is the fundamental structure of American constitutional law, regardless of the level of review being applied. With
respect to shackling, when analyzing these interests, the focus has
been on the woman—the state’s interest in protecting society from an
inmate who may be dangerous, and the woman’s interest in maintaining her bodily autonomy consistent with the right against cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment.132
This discussion shifts the analysis to the fetus and child who is also
affected by shackling practices. Directly transposing abortion jurisprudence shows that the state’s interests in protecting potential human
life and fetal dignity are not unique to the abortion context and may
be even stronger in this context where the state acts to essentially ensure that the fetus is delivered. Then, upon birth, the analysis shifts
to view the interests in light of an innocent, newborn infant with unfettered rights, which the state has an interest in protecting.
Regarding an inmate’s ability to choose abortion, “the State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child.” 133 How,
then, can the state reject the same rights in the shackling context?
This discussion does not contend that fetal rights should be recognized
or constitutionalized, as that would significantly complicate women’s

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Griggs, supra note 53, at 253; ACLU BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 1, at *3.
ACLU BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 1.
Id. at *4.
See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (emphasis added).
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access to abortion. 134 Rather, this discussion functions within the current abortion framework that recognizes state interests in protecting
fetal life, to a certain extent. Then, the focus shifts to the constitutionally protected citizen once the child is born. To contextualize this discussion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade stated:
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like
any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that
insure maximum safety for the patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate provision for any complication or emergency that might arise. 135

It goes without saying that there are glaring discrepancies between this language and what is happening to incarcerated
women and the children born to them. This Section illustrates
the state’s interests in shackling, first during gestation as it
relates to potential fetal life, and second, after birth as it relates to the child.

1. Protecting Fetal Health—A State Interest Vindicated by
Abortion Law
The U.S. Supreme Court increasingly recognizes and upholds the
state’s interests in protecting a fetus as gestation progresses. 136 To that
end, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Gonzales v. Carhart, fifteen
years after Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 137 that regardless of “one’s views concerning the Casey joint opinion, . . . a premise central to its conclusion [is clear]—. . . the government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life . . . .” 138 To accomplish consistency in a world in which
Casey and its progeny controls, 139 the state must recognize that its interests in “preserving and promoting fetal life” are not exclusive to the
abortion context. No medical difference exists between a fetus being
carried in the third trimester by a woman who is seeking an abortion
and a fetus being carried in the third trimester whose mother plans to
134. See generally Fiona de Londras, Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutary Tale
from Ireland, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 243 (2015).
135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (emphasis added).
136. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145-46 (2007); Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846.
137. 505 U.S. 833.
138. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 145.
139. The “undue burden” standard from Casey is controlling is an even more concrete
notion following the Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136
S. Ct. 2292 (2016), which despite its opportunity to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and/or Casey, explicitly applied and thereby affirmed the standard from Casey. See
also Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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give birth. If anything, the difference is that the latter will certainly
be delivered. Thus, the state’s recognized interests in protecting fetal
life must also apply when discussing incarcerated pregnancy.
Yet, such interests are directly contradicted by the enactment and
implementation of shackling practices. Under the Casey “undue burden” framework, the state emphasizes its interest in protecting both
the mental health of the woman and the health of the fetus once it
reaches viability. 140 Viability is “the point at which a fetus could potentially live outside the mother’s womb without medical aid.” 141 Casey
suggests that the state’s interests are valid before the child is born.142
While this may differ from the wishes of some abortion advocates, for
now, this is the current framework—women have the right to choose
without any substantial obstacle until the state’s interests become significant enough to be involved in the consideration.143 Living in the
Casey framework, the state should not be allowed to abandon its responsibility to the fetus simply because the mother is incarcerated.
In sum, shackling incarcerated women undercuts the state’s purported interests in fetal wellbeing, the fundamental premise of the Casey “undue burden” framework. Though a woman—or anyone for that
matter—loses civil liberties when imprisoned, 144 such deprivation
should not extend so far as to impede the medical interests of an innocent child,145 which segues to the next Section discussing the child’s
rights. In other words, “imprisonment . . . does not completely strip
individuals [or their offspring] of their most basic constitutional and
human rights.”146

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 11 (2015).
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
See generally id. at 833.
Forman, Jr., supra note 33, at 27-29; Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59-60.
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).
Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59-60.
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2. Protecting the Child—A Constitutional “Person”
A significant event takes place when the fetus exits the womb and
enters the world. 147 “[W]hen a child draws his first breath, he [becomes] protected under the law” 148 and the U.S. Constitution as a “person” and U.S. citizen. 149 This distinction is reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Gonzales v. Carhart, 150 where the Court defined the specific point during birth at which the fetus has been partially born and its death may then justify criminal liability. 151 The
state has an “interest and general obligation to protect life” 152 and “respect . . . the dignity of human life.” 153 After birth, therefore, the state
cannot infringe upon the child’s constitutional rights. Such rights, as
characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court, are “virtually coextensive
with that of an adult.” 154
Even further distinguishing the child from its incarcerated mother is
the reality that so many children born to incarcerated mothers are not
parented by these mothers. In fact, “most babies [born to incarcerated
women] are removed [from the mother] within 24 hours of birth.” 155
“Newborns are usually given to grandmothers or other family” 156 or become wards of the state and are either sent into foster care or adoption.157 Therefore, the state’s interest in protecting a child born to an
incarcerated mother is arguably stronger because the state will become
the guardian of the child,158 as opposed to a child born to a ‘free’ mother

147. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157; Collins, supra note 10, at 24 (“Abortion
advocates . . . contend[] that life does not begin until birth.”).
148. Collins, supra note 10, at 24 (emphasis added).
149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (stating that “person” within the Constitution is applied “only postnatally”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1976).
150. 550 U.S. 124.
151. Id. at 147-48. Mens rea (or the subjective intent) for causing the death must also be
proven to impose criminal liability. Id. at 148-49.
152. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. How life is defined is what affects abortion jurisprudence;
however, here, life is non-debatable once the child is born.
153. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157.
154. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
155. FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6.
156. Id.
157. E.g., CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 43-44; RAM SUBRAMANIAN & ALISON SHAMES,
VERA INST. JUST., SENTENCING AND PRISON PRACTICES IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 3, 16 (2013), https://storage.googleapis.com/
vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/sentencing-and-prison-practices-in-germany-andthe-netherlands-implications-for-the-united-states/legacy_downloads/european-americanprison-report-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3BS-F8TG].
158. See Laura Oren, DeShaney’s Unfinished Business: The Foster Child’s Due Process
Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REV. 113, 116, 122-24 (1990) (explaining how the foster care system allows the state to usurp the parent’s role).
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who will raise the child on her own. 159 With that, the interests of the
child who will be permanently disconnected from its incarcerated
mother become individually more significant. Switching to the state’s
focus on the parents rather than the child: The child’s new parents—
foster, adoptive, or the state—have an interest in the child being taken
care of, or protected, by the state until the child reaches their care.160

C. Empirically Dispelling Security Concerns—Escape, Harm to Herself, Harm to Others
The security rationales for shackling have been empirically refuted.
First, women are primarily incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, such
as drug use. 161 So, women inmates generally do not have violent dispositions and have not shown a propensity for violence. 162 In fact, some
academics propose the exact opposite: that the prison population is
comprised of victims rather than people who cause harm to others. 163
Thus, the idea that these women, especially when pregnant and nearing the most enduring part of their pregnancy, pose a risk to those
around them is based on false pretenses.
Further, even if they were dangerous, these women, and inmates in
general, do not enter medical facilities at their leisure. Shackling and
chaining policies demonstrate this point in the extreme. Instead, in
addition to physical restraints, inmates are usually escorted by officers
who stay with the inmate throughout treatment.164 Thus, if a woman
attempted to escape, despite the argument above, she would be
stopped by the guard—rendering shackling/chaining essentially superfluous and merely punitive, if anything. In states that have eliminated or significantly limited shackling/chaining practices, no escapes
of incarcerated, pregnant women have been reported. 165
This is intuitively sound; a woman enduring child birth is unlikely
to muster the energy or ability to escape a medical facility. Even if she
could escape, why would she? She needs medical care to deliver her
child and recover from child birth. Assumedly, a woman would not

159. Cf. Lachman, supra note 37 (explaining how Alabama basically used this interest
as leverage to stop the incarcerated woman from having an abortion by moving to terminate
her parental rights).
160. See Oren, supra note 158, at 116.
161. See CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 34.
162. See MARY BOSWORTH, ENGENDERING RESISTANCE: AGENCY AND POWER IN WOMEN’S
PRISONS 56 (David Nelken ed., 1999); CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 34.
163. See id. at 56.
164. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ESCORTED TRIPS § 570.40 (2008)
(stating that approved prisoners are generally transported for medical care).
165. Cf. SUBRAMANIAN & SHAMES, supra note 157, at 13 (reporting that only one percent of
inmates who were given passes for visitation in Germany tried to abuse the privilege and escape).
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think it is in the best interests of her child or herself to escape a medical facility and confront the burden and risk of child birth alone. Further, escaping prison is generally disadvantageous to the woman and
almost always results in re-incarceration. 166 Similarly, the idea that a
woman poses a security risk to herself significantly lacks empirical
support. In Florida, for example, there were only six suicides among
incarcerated women—pregnant and non-pregnant—between 2000 and
2015.167 For the same time period, there were 119 male suicides.168
Consolidating and contextualizing this disproval of security concerns within a constitutional analysis, we see that shackling and
chaining policies are unconstitutional. While the state’s security concerns are barely valid, even with a valid security concern, the policies
are not narrowly tailored to address these concerns. 169 The next Section discusses further the unconstitutionality of these policies within
the context of the state’s interests in protecting fetal rights—as outlined in the abortion framework—and the child’s rights—as outlined
by the Constitution and child custody laws.

166. CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 79-80.
167. Inmate Mortality: Cause of Death by Gender 2000-2016, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/mortality/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). There was one
female suicide in 2000, one in 2003, one in 2006, one in 2008, and there were two in 2009. Id.
168. Id. The gender populations for each year was as follows:
Men

Women

2015

93,032

7,018

2014

93,792

7,150

2013

93,813

7,071

2012

93,579

6,948

2011

95,139

7,180

2010

95,088

7,144

2009

93,857

7,037

2008

91,304

6,888

2007

86,294

6,550

2006

82,360

6,216

2005

79,221

5,680

2004

76,675

5,299

2003

72,520

4,796

2002

69,164

4,389

2001

67,762

4,245

2000

67,214

4,019

Inmate Population, Index to Statistics and Populations, FLA. DEP’T

OF CORRECTIONS,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/ (assessing Departmental Annual Reports for FY 2015 through
FY 2000) (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
169. Cf. Griggs, supra note 53, at 261.
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D. Why Shackling the Mother Is Unconstitutional—The Child’s
Rights and State’s Interest in Fetal Life
When a newborn is delivered, the child is no longer a fetus and becomes a ‘person’ of its own right to protection under the U.S. Constitution. With such embodiment comes civil liberties and undeniable human rights. Stated another way, the child is an individual separate
from the mother with its own rights. The child custody context illustrates this principle, in which the system considers and compares the
child’s rights juxtaposed with the parents’ rights. At times, infants,
toddlers, and children of all ages are separated from their parents to
protect the child’s interests; 170 as mentioned above, such is the case for
many children of incarcerated parents. 171
Shackling supporters “argue that the shackling of women during
labor is not inhumane because these women are prisoners.” 172 No matter the crime for which the mother is sentenced, though, the child has
not committed any crime. 173 Thus, the rights of the newborn child must
be protected, despite any loss of civil liberties by the mother 174 via incarceration that may support the rhetoric for keeping shackling practices intact. 175 This Section addresses the fetus’s and then the child’s
rights throughout the most problematic periods in which female inmates are being restrained—the third trimester of pregnancy, labor
and delivery, and postpartum recovery. Underlying this entire discussion is the notion that the only pregnancies which are relevant here
are those that will be carried to term—due either to the mother’s choice
to have her child or her inability to access an abortion due to the prison
facility’s control. This becomes the basis for the argument that shackling is unconstitutional for reasons other than the rights of the mother
and why states implementing or allowing shackling practices are neglecting their interests assumed in other arenas, such as abortion.176
Despite the fact that shackling practices have “been around for at least

170. See Melanie Kalmanson, Giving the Pawns a Voice: A Call for Mandatory
Representation of Children in High-Conflict Custody Battles, 5 T. MARSHALL SCH. L.J. GENDER,

RACE & JUST. 54, Part II (2015) (explaining the custody system’s focus on the child’s best interests).
171. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
172. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 132.
173. Supra note 145, 154 and accompanying text.
174. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011).
175. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 158 (1973).
176. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64 (stating that the state has an “important and legitimate
interest in potential life” at viability “because the fetus then presumably has the capability
of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”).
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a century[,] . . . the law on the shackling of pregnant women is underdeveloped,” 177 and history’s acceptance does not dictate that these modernly repulsive practices be allowed. 178

1. Invoking Abortion Jurisprudence to Invalidate Shackling During the Third Trimester
The third trimester of a pregnancy includes weeks twenty-seven
through forty of gestation. 179 “Gestation” is “the development of a human embryo or fetus between fertilization and birth.” 180 At thirty-eight
weeks, “the fetus is considered full term.” 181 The third trimester is significant, especially within the context of the current abortion framework, as the time-frame in which the fetus reaches viability. 182 As explained above, viability is the point at which the state’s interests in
fetal life become concrete and protectable by acceptable legislation.
In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court banned abortion during
the third trimester (unless necessary for the mother’s health), finding
that the state’s interests in protecting fetal life outweighed the
mother’s privacy interests at that point. 183 The Court stated:
Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of
the embryo or fetus not prevail.
...
In assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given to the
less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the
177. Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 569 (6th Cir. 2013). Nor is this
a reason for the practice to stand.
178. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
179. Fetal Development: Third Trimester, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, [hereinafter
AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N], http://americanpregnancy.org/while-pregnant/third-trimester/
[https://perma.cc/3E95-L789] (defining the third trimester as starting at the twenty-seventh
week); Fetal Development: The Third Trimester, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/
healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/in-depth/fetal-development/art-20045997 [https://
perma.cc/HPU9-YSPG]. Note, however, that Florida, for example, just redefined “[t]hird trimester” to mean “the period of time from the beginning of the 24th week of gestation through
birth.” FLA. STAT. § 390.011(12)(c) (2016) (Act became effective July 1, 2016).
180. FLA. STAT. § 390.011(6) (2016) (Act became effective July 1, 2016).
181. AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, supra note 179.
182. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (defining viability).
183. 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe
v. Wade emphasized the doctor-patient relationship involved in abortion procedures to establish that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is within a woman’s right to privacy under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at
163. The physician-patient dynamic is also reflected in shackling policies, where legislation
allows for physicians to affect whether restraints are used on the woman. The significance
of this physician-patient relationship should also be further emphasized and respected in
shackling policies.
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State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant
woman alone. 184

Doing away with the trimester framework from Roe, the U.S.
Supreme Court nevertheless reaffirmed the state’s interest in
protecting viable fetal life in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey. 185
Accordingly, it is significant in the shackling context that third trimester fetuses will be carried to term. Even if abortion jurisprudence
were to change from the present standard to allow abortions up until
birth, the state’s interests in protecting the fetus in the shackling context are still arguably stronger. This is because, as previously discussed, inmates have limited access to abortion and, therefore, a general obligation to carry the pregnancy to term. In other words, regardless of third trimester abortion jurisprudence, it is virtually guaranteed in the shackling context that potential life will become human
life, barring any unexpected medical complications.
The central holding of Roe v. Wade, 186 the governing framework of
Casey, 187 and the application of these in cases like Gonzales v. Carhart, 188 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 189 and Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt 190 remain valid. 191 Gonzales v. Carhart seems to
be substantially applicable in this context. 192 There, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, relying partially on
the brutality of the operation that would be allowed if the Court invalidated the Act. 193 The Court further stated that Casey “confirms the
State’s interest in promoting respect for human life at all stages in the
pregnancy.” 194 Therefore, the state may legitimately ban barbaric practices to further its interests in fetal life and the dignity thereof. Thus,
the state has an interest in banning the use of shackling and other

184. Id. at 150.
185. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). The undue-burden standard from Casey was further affirmed in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309-10 (2016).
186. 410 U.S. at 153.
187. 505 U.S. 833; see supra note 137-146 and accompanying text.
188. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
189. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
190. 136 S. Ct. 2292.
191. Id. at 2300.
192. See generally 550 U.S. 124 (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
193. Id. at 160.
194. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). Whether the Carhart reasoning is sound within the
context of the mother’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy is immaterial here because inmate pregnancies being discussed herein will not be aborted. Even if they were, the
state’s interests would essentially be equal to those at play in abortion.
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restraints during the third trimester of an incarcerated women’s pregnancy because it undermines the dignity and safety of fetal life after
viability,195 as understood in current abortion jurisprudence.

2. Labor and Delivery
“Labor is the process by which the fetus and the placenta leave the
uterus.” 196 There are three stages of labor that may “begin weeks before a woman delivers her infant.” 197 The final stage of labor “begins
with the birth [of the infant] and ends with the completed delivery of
the placenta and afterbirth.” 198 This stage, thus, invokes the constitutionally significant birth. As discussed above, the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits have determined that shackling practices during labor and
delivery are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 199

(a) The Child’s Constitutional Rights
Aside from the empirical evidence undermining the Sixth Circuit’s
recognition of the objective exceptions, what the Carhart Court fails to
recognize is the other constitutionally protected, involved human
whose rights are being violated. This Section explains how the infant’s
constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth
Amendment) and guarantee of substantive due process (Fourteenth
Amendment) are violated by shackling practices.
Beginning with the Eighth Amendment, regardless of the applicability of any ‘exception,’ which is empirically rare, 200 society does not
tolerate harm to innocent infants. In fact, much of society—expressed
vehemently by the pro-life movement—disavows negative treatment
of a fetus, which is not even constitutionally protected. Relating back
to the “deliberate indifference” standard applied in the Nelson and Villegas cases explained above, 201 there are two prongs to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation. Subjectively, regardless of official notice, the harm being caused, or the significantly increased likelihood of
harm, to an infant born by a restrained mother seems quite apparent.
195. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (defining viability).
196. What is Labor?, EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NAT’L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH & HUM.
DEV., https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pregnancy/conditioninfo/pages/labor.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Z6SE-YV53].
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text discussing Nelson v. Correctional
Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009), and Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013).
200. See discussion supra Section III.C.
201. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text discussing Nelson, 583 F.3d 522,
and Villegas, 709 F.3d 563.
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So, official notice seems unnecessary. In all, there is a per se Eighth
Amendment violation by subjecting an innocent—therefore undeserving of punishment—infant to the harm of shackling practices during
labor and delivery. 202
Further, subjecting these infants to restraints by and through the
mother intrudes upon the child’s due process right to safety, bodily autonomy, etc. These rights are especially implicated since the restraints
are being placed by the state on the infant’s mother, who is confined
by the state. 203 Thus, governmental action is much more directly involved here than in cases where due process claims have been denied
for lack of state action, such as DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 204 where the plaintiff’s due process claim
against the child protective services agency for failing to adequately
protect his safety was denied because the abuse was perpetrated by a
private actor, the plaintiff’s father. 205 Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, “[t]he [S]tate (by its own acts) may not
deprive an individual of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.” 206 Children, as constitutionally protected persons,207 have “substantive rights to safety and freedom from undue restraint,” 208 which
are therefore violated when the state imposes shackling practices on
the child’s mother during labor and delivery, subjecting the child to
substantial harm. Thus, shackling practices are unconstitutional because they violate the child’s due process rights.

(b) Statutory Analysis of the Child’s Best Interests
When a court must determine which parent is the most suitable to
care for a child in a custody dispute, its analysis centers around the
child’s best interests.209 Best interests statutes “usually present several factors which are considered to directly correlate with the ‘child’s
physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being.’ Courts are to
analyze the unique facts of each case within the framework of such
factors to determine the most favorable corresponding custody arrangement.” 210 These factors also shed light on the shackling discussion, which directly implicates the child’s best interests.
202. Cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011).
203. See Oren, supra note 158, at 128.
204. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
205. See generally id. at 189.
206. Oren, supra note 158, at 129.
207. See id. at 139 (stating that children have equal rights to adults in another context).
208. Id. at 137.
209. Kalmanson, supra note 170, at Part II (explaining the current custody structure in depth).
210. Id. at 57 (quoting S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)) (citations
omitted); accord, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2015).
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In this context, a few best interest factors are especially relevant.211
For example, “[t]he moral fitness of the parents” 212 and “[t]he mental
and physical health of the parents” 213 are both best interests factors,
meaning that these parental statuses affect the adult’s ability to parent the child. 214 In that sense, due to the detrimental effects of shackling practices on the mother’s health—physically and emotionally—
shackling practices directly undermine these two best interests factors
by lessening the mother’s “moral fitness” and “mental and physical
health,” which contribute to her parenting.
Further, “[t]he developmental stages and needs of the child and the
demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to meet the
child’s developmental needs,” another factor in the best interests analysis,215 would be complicated with a child who is a victim of shackling
practices. This interest is completely independent of the mother and
the effect shackling may have on her well-being. In other words, by
implementing shackling practices, the state undermines this best interest factor regardless of the mother’s actions.

3. Postpartum
Despite being distinct legal entities, the time immediately following
birth—known as postpartum—is critical for the infant’s development
and the mother’s recovery. 216 Today, “[m]others and babies are no
longer separated almost immediately after birth.” 217 Restraining a
woman or removing the child from her undermines the child’s ability
to bond with its mother, or at least reap the biological benefits from
this postpartum period. This is especially important when the child
will not be put into adoption or foster care and will eventually be raised
by its biological mother following her incarceration. Even when the inmate will not raise the child, though, there are benefits that the biological mother may provide to the baby immediately following birth.
Considering the significance that the postpartum period has for the
child’s development, restraints should also be eliminated during this
time to allow the mother’s full recovery, which will, in the long term,
211. Drawn from Florida’s best interests statutory factors, for example.
212. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(f).
213. Id. § 61.13(3)(g).
214. Obviously, the fact of incarceration would militate against the mother having custody of the child; however, for this analysis, it is considered for the longevity of the parentchild relationship, continuing after incarceration.
215. Id. § 61.13(3)(s).
216. SUBRAMANIAN & SHAMES, supra note157, at 12.
217. Mary M. Murry, Labor and Delivery: Then vs. Now, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/expert-blog/labor-anddelivery-than-and-now/bgp-20090302.
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benefit the child by maintaining and preserving the mother’s physical and
emotional well-being and allowing the necessary biological development.
IV. CONCLUSION
A newborn is minutes old; its entire life lies ahead. Such life can either be cloaked in innocence, as the “ ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law’ ” would suggest; 218 or, it can be immediately tainted
with an environment of unnecessary punishment, likely imposing physical and emotional difficulties. Fetal life, or the state’s interests in protecting the same, and the subsequent, more substantial, interests of the
child born to an incarcerated woman render unconstitutional shackling
and other restraints of pregnant, incarcerated women.
Current shackling discourse generally underemphasizes these interests, which are supplemented by both the mother’s and the child’s
human rights to dignity, respect, and protection against cruel and unusual punishment. This Note brings those interests, unfettered by incarceration, to the forefront, presenting a likely more universally acceptable rationale for following the precedent set by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and American Bar Association for severely restricting
the use of physical restraints on pregnant inmates in American correctional facilities to protect the resulting children. 219

218. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432, 453 (1895)).
219. Recognizing the effects shackling practices have on both incarcerated women and
the children they bear unveils a significant need for uniformity in anti-shackling legislation.
Across-the-board legislation is the first step. State-wide legislation can only ensure protection to a certain extent due to the localization of prison management. Enforcement of restrictive legislation, including oversight at the local level, is the ultimate end-goal to ensure that
pregnant inmates and their children are protected.

